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RENT WITHHOLDING WON'T WORK: THE NEED
FOR A REALISTIC REHABILITATION POLICY
Current levels of public funding require that the demand for housing
by low income families be satisfied by already existent housing.' Al-
though the quality of housing in such low income areas may vary, sub-
standard concentrations are typical.2 Dwelling rehabilitation has thus
been recognized as an essential element in meeting the housing needs
of urban areas.3
Traditionally, those low income tenants residing in substandard hous-
ing were forced to rely on the willingness of the landlord to fulfill his
duty to maintain leasehold property.4  To alleviate the tenants' power-
less position, "rent withholding" was conceptualized, a proposal which
would make the payment of rent contingent upon the landlord's proper
maintenance, thus enabling tenants to assume an enhanced bargaining
position from which to obtain rehabilitation.,
The legal implications of rent withholding have been extensively can-
vassed in legal journals, and rent withholding has emerged as an object
of praise.6 In light of increased landlord abandonment, however, it is
1. See THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF HOUSING ABANDON-
MENT 93 (3d ed. Mar. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SURvEY OF ABANDONMENT].
2. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT-PosSIBLE PROGRAM
FOR COUNTERACTING HOUSING ABANDONMENT 14 (June 1971) [hereinafter cited as
REAL E STATE]; cf. INsTITUTE FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES, WASHNGTON UNI-
vERSriy, URBAN DECAY IN ST. Louis 86 (Mar. 1972) [hereinafter cited as URBAN
DECAY].
3. PRE IDENT'S CoMMIrTE ON URBAN HousING, A DECENT Ho E 21 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as KAISER REPORT].
4. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1941 (West 1970). This section places a duty on
the lessor to maintain the premises. Note that "leasehold property" in this article is
not confined to written lease agreements. Indeed, it embraces all rental property.
In this context, lease is defined as "[a]ny agreement which gives rise to relationship of
landlord and tenant." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1035 (1968), citing Smith v. Royal
Ins. Co., 111 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1940).
5. See Moskovitz, The Model Landlord-Tenant Code-An Unacceptable Compromise,
3 URBAN LAw. 597, 598 (1971).
6. See Flitton, Rent Withholding: Public and Private, 2 HARv. Crv. RIGHTS-COW. Lm.
L. REV. 179 (1967); Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern
Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1970);
Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAw.
577 (1971); Keating & Heskin, Rent Withholding-Recent Legislative Developments, 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 728 (1971); Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A
Study in Frustration, 21 HASTiNGS L.J. 287 (1970); Moskovitz, The Model Landlord-
Tenant Code-An Unacceptable Compromise, 3 URBAN LAW. 597 (1971); Stang,
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clear that such evaluations have failed to adequately explore the eco-
nomic implications of rent withholding. Such exploration indicates
that rent withholding can not be defended as a viable solution to the
problem of housing rehabilitation. Policy changes for more effective
housing code enforcement are necessary if the increasing trend toward
coerced abandonment is to be curtailed.
I. TENANT RESPONSE TO LANDLORD'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN
THE LEASEHOLD
Whether or not the rental agreement outlines the obligations of the
landlord, either a statutory or a judicial duty to maintain, controls the
residential leasehold.3 When the rented dwelling space falls below
housing code standards, the landlord is obligated to remedy the de-
ficiency.' If the landlord fails to repair the premises, tenant options
are severely limited. With increasing tenant awareness of legal reme-
dies through tenant organizations and legal services,'0 however, it is not
unreasonable to assume that a significant number of tenants in substand-
ard housing will be prepared to avail themselves of whatever options
promise improved living conditions.
The first option, reliance on conventional housing code enforcement
programs by government, has uniformly failed to assure that low in-
come landlords will comply with the codes.," Housing code enforce-
Tenants Initiated Repairs: New York's Article 7A, 2 HARv. Civ. RJGHTS-ClV. LIE. L.
REV. 201 (1967); Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1965); Comment, Rent Withholding: A New Ap-
proach to Landlord-Tenant Problem, 2 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 105 (1969); Note, Rent With-
holding for Minnesota: A Proposal, 55 MINN. L. REv. 82 (1970).
7. See text accompanying notes 112-17 infra.
8. See, e.g., Greenffield v. Garrett Biblical Institute, 1 CCH 1972 Pov. L. REP.
§ 2210.10 (Ill. Cir. Ct., 1970) (judicially imposed duty) and CAL. Civ. CODE § 1941
(West 1970) which provides:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it unten-
antable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and twenty-
nine;
9. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 1941 (West 1970) (general tenantability). See also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1970) (self-help remedy).
10. M. PADNos, THE TENANT MOVEMENT, PAPERS SUBM1TrED TO THE Suncommrnv
ON HOUSINo PANELS ON HOUSING PRODUCTION, HOUSING DEMAND, AND DEVELOPING A
SUITABLE LIVING ENVIRONMENT, Part 2, H.R. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 654 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as TENANT MOVEMENT].
11. See KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. The California state building standards
are defined in the California Administrative Code. It should be noted, however, that
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 17925 (West Supp. 1973) allows for modification
for local conditions. Los Angeles, as is the case with many other cities, has its own
set of building codes.
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ment programs have failed primarily because the cost of rehabilitation
in low income housing is prohibitive.' 2 Housing code enforcement pro-
grams have also been hampered by insufficient staff's and inordinate
delays.' 4 Even when housing codes are enforced, courts often impose
only minimal fines for noncompliance.'
Since government enforcement of housing codes is ineffective, low
income tenants must select from other equally unpromising alternatives.
One choice in some jurisdictions'0 is to utilize repair and deduct statutes.
The California statute, one which typifies this approach, allows the ten-
ant to make repairs and deduct the expenditure from the rent. Califor-
nia and other states adopting this approach, however, usually limit the
use of this device to once in any year and limit the amount to be de-
ducted to one month's rent.' 7  Ostensibly, such a statutory mechanism
is a sufficient catalyst to force landlords to make minor repairs. In the
context of inner city low-income housing, however, the necessary repairs
are often of such magnitude that repair and deduct statutes fail to pro-
vide sufficient rehabilitative funds.' s They, consequently, serve neither
as an adequate means by which the tenant can repair his dwelling, nor
as an effective incentive to landlord maintenance.
Another course which the low income tenant could consider is to
The enforcement procedure as defined in the CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §
17970 (West 1964) provides for an inspection by the local agency. Upon the discovery
of a violation, § 17980 requires that a thirty day notice be given during which time the
deficiency is to be remedied. §§ 17981-82 then provide for the filing of a complaint in
superior court for an order allowing the enforcement agency to abate a nuisance.
Finally, § 17995 defines any violation of the Building Code as a misdemeanor punish-
able by a $500 fine and/or six months in jail.
12. Grigsby, Economic Aspects of Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAw. 533,
537 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Grigsby].
13. See G. STERNLEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 179 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
TENEMENT LANDLORD].
14. Id.
15. NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.
R. Doe. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS
REPORT].
16. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 47-16-13 (1960).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942(a) (West Supp. 1973) provides:
If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he
ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, where
the cost of such repairs does not require an expenditure greater than one month's
rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent . . .
This remedy shall not be available to the lessee more than once in any 12 month
period.
18. The limitation to one month's rent is such that the repair and deduct remedy




change residence. 19 Obviously, a change of residence can provide a
solution only if there is housing available which meets required stand-
ards. For the typical low income tenant, such housing is simply not
available.20
The last response available to the tenant is to withhold rent. Be-
cause the other alternatives are so obviously ineffectual, tenants in in-
creasing numbers have been withholding their rent when landlords have
failed to adequately maintain their premises.2' Withholding of rent pro-
vides the tenant with the quickest means of retribution against the land-
lord.22 Significantly, rent withholding can be initiated at the tenant's
option, providing an improvement in his bargaining position.
Until recently, landlord-tenant law did not sanction the withholding
of rent by the tenant when the landlord failed to maintain the premises. 2
A lease was treated as containing independent covenants to pay rent
and to repair 24 with the result that the landlord's failure to maintain the
19. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942(a) (West Supp. 1973) which provides:
If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he
ought to repair, he neglects to do so . . . the lessee may vacate the premises, in
which case he shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of
other conditions.
20. See notes 80-85 infra and accompanying text. Frequent changes of residence may
prove burdensome in themselves. The expense of moving, changing phones, paying
utility deposits, as well as the time loss involved, may create a financial burden which
the low income tenant is not in a position to absorb. This in itself may prevent the
low income tenant from venturing a move.
21. An increasing trend in rent withholding has been noted in one study. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF
ABANDONED HOUSING 167 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HUD].
Perhaps the lack of a hearing before the initiation of rent abatement by the tenant
constitutes a taking of property without due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), a prejudgment garnish-
ment of wages was held to be a taking without due process when there was no notice
or hearing. Id. at 342. By analogizing rent to wages, it is arguable that abatement
is a taking by the tenant without due process. The tenant could avoid this problem
by initiating rent abatement through a declaratory relief action. This was the pro-
cedure used in Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
The rent escrow method avoids this problem by requiring a hearing at the outset. See
text accompanying note 62 infra. Of course, the due process argument would require
a showing of state action, which would seem to be quite a formidable task.
22. Flitton, Rent Withholding: Public and Private, 2 HAzv. Civ. RicIrrs-Crv. Lm.
L. REV. 179 (1967); Gilhood, Social Aspects of Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN
LAW. 546, 549 (1971).
23. See Moskovitz, The Model Landlord-Tenant Code-An Unacceptable Compromise,
3 URBAN LAw. 597, 598 (1971), "The recent trend toward recognition of rent with-
holding has as yet emerged in only a few jurisdictions." See notes 30, 37, 44, and
59 infra.
24. W. BuRnY, REAL PROPERTY 150 (3d ed. 1965). In Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 86-87 (1972), Justice Douglas contended that the concept that covenants of a
lease are independent is changing, as evidenced by rent withholding cases such as
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premises did not relieve the tenant of his obligation to pay rent. The
tenant's only remedy was to move,2 5 which, as previously discussed,
promised marginal benefits at best.
26
Tenants in a modem society are renting not merely space in a build-
ing but shelter and a number of services as well.21 The rental "package"
includes more than just walls and ceilings, it necessarily implies proper
maintenance. Myron Moskovitz, a leading advocate of tenants' rights,
28
contends that making the payment of rent contingent upon the proper
maintenance of the leasehold property is essential to tenant protection.2D
1I. METmoDs OF RENT WITHHOLDING
Rent withholding attempts to accomplish its goal of coercing the land-
lord into complying with housing codes, by interrupting the cash flow
from rental property to the landlord until necessary repairs are made.
There are two ways in which this cash flow to the landlord can be dis-
rupted. The first is by allowing the tenant to remain in possession with-
out payment of rent or with payment of rent at a reduced rate, i.e., rent
abatement. The second way of disrupting cash flow is by diverting the
rental payments to a third party, i.e., rent escrow.
A. Rent Abatement Methods
Four methods of rent abatement have been utilized to allow tenants
to remain in possession without payment of rent or payment of rent in
a reduced amount: illegal contract theory, implied warranty of habit-
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See text accom-
panying notes 37-42 infra.
25. Where a lessor's failure to maintain resulted in a substantial interference with the
use of property, the tenant could vacate within a reasonable time, Butt v. Bertola,
110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952), with no further liability to pay rent. Green
v. Redding, 92 Cal. 548, 28 P. 599 (1891). This concept is termed constructive
eviction and has been codified in California (for residential leases). CAL. Cim. CODB
§ 1942 (West Supp. 1973).
26. See text accompanying notes 80-85 infra which indicates that low income tenants
cannot readily find alternate housing.
27. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they seek
a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable
plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper
maintenance.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28. Myron Moskovitz is the Chief Attorney, Housing Law Section of the National
Housing and Economics Development Law Project at Berkeley.
29. Moskovitz, The Model Landlord-Tenant Code-An Unacceptable Compromise,
3 URBAN LAw. 597, 598 (1971).
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ability, statutory rent abatement, and rent abatement unsanctioned by
law.
1. Illegal Contract Theory
Initially, as a defense to legal actions for rent, it has been advanced
that a lease is an unenforceable illegal contract30 if at the time of the
creation of the contract,"1 a substantial building code violation32 existed
and if the landlord knew of its existence.33  The rationale for allow-
ig such a defense is that a contract which leases property in violation
of housing codes has an illegal purpose and thus should not be en-
forced.34 Although effective in barring an action for rent, the illegal
contract theory is of limited value in this context because it does
not bar an action for possession. Its implementation consequently
forces the termination of the lease,8 5 an undesirable result to the low
income tenant who is often without a suitable housing alternative. Even
more significantly, since the theory cannot be applied unless a known
substantial violation of the housing code exists at the inception of the
rental agreement, it is inapplicable if the violation develops, or is dis-
covered, during the period of occupancy 6
30. Cases which have utilized the illegal contract theory include: Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Howell v. City of Hamburg Co., 165 Cal.
172, 131 P. 130 (1913); Shephard v. Lerner, 182 Cal. App. 2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1960); Longenecker v. Hardin, 264 N.E.2d 878 (M11. Ct. App. 1970); Glyco v. Schultz,
289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972); Contra, Riley v. Nelson, 183 S.E.2d
328 (S.C. 1971); Posnanski v. Hood, 174 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1970). It should be noted
that the California cases cited in this footnote involved leases of commercial, not
residential, property.
31. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. App. 1968); Saunders
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836, 837 (D.C. App. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
32. See note 42 infra.
33. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836 (D.C. App. 1968) (requires
knowledge only on the part of the lessor). In Shephard v. Lerner, 182 Cal. App. 2d
746, 749-51, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433, 434-36 (1960), however, both parties were aware of
the violation upon the creation of the contract. In that case, in denying the landlords
suit for rent, the court adduced that since the parties acted in pari delicto, the contract
was unenforceable by either party. Ostensibly, in Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d
62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972), the requirement of mutuality of knowledge was af-
firmed when the court argued inter alia that since the tenant in Hinson did not
willingly acquiesce in the illegality, Hinson fell within the theory of implied warranty
of habitability and not that of illegal contract. Id. at 67, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
34. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. App. 1968).
35. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Howell v.
City of Hamburg Co., 165 Cal. 172, 131 P. 130 (1913); Shephard v. Lerner, 182 Cal.
App. 2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960). In the above cases the tenant moved out prior
to disposition by the court. In the other cases which have utilized this theory (see
note 30 supra) it is unclear whether or not the tenant had moved.
36. See Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C. App. 1968),
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2. Implied Warranty of Habitability
The concept that a lease of residential property carries with it an
implied warranty of habitability has been used as a defense both in ac-
tions of eviction and actions for rent.37  The implied warranty theory
serves as a defense in either action, if the tenant is able to show that a
substantial violation 8 of the housing code existed during the period
rent was withheld. 9 The t.,nant has a responsibility to inform the
landlord of the conditions which need repair in a way which will allow
a reasonable period to remedy the deficiency.40 The tenant is not en-
tirely relieved of his obligation to pay rent, but is liable only for the
reasonable rental value of the premises. 1
rev'd on other grounds, sub nor Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1970). The court in Saunders refused to extend the theory of Brown to
cover violations of housing codes which arise after commencement of the lease.
37. Cases which have utilized the implied warranty of habitability theory are as
follows: Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hinson
v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 462
P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1972);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H.
1971); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970); Jackson v. Rivera, 318 N.Y.S.2d
7 (Civ. Ct. City N.Y. 1971); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961). The
Hinson case at best is weak authority since the landlord did not even attempt to
respond to the tenant's appeal, and the appellate court did not even discuss whether
or not the remedies for the landlord's failure to repair set out in CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1942 (West Supp. 1973) are exclusive remedies. It was noted in a statement by a
consultant for the California State Assembly Judiciary Committee that some of the
trial courts in California are not following the Hinson case. L.A. Daily J., Apr. 13,
1973, at p. 1, col. 3.
38. See note 42 infra.
39. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The
theory of implied warranty of habitability is most often used as a defense to an
action for rent or eviction. In this context the implied warranty of habitability acts
as an affirmative defense to the landlord's claim. If the general rule for assigning
the burden of proof is followed, the burden of proof would lie with the tenant to
demonstrate that a breach of the implied warranty existed. CAL. Evm. CODE § 500
(West 1968).
40. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972).
41. See Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972);
Academy Spires v. Jones, 261 A.2d 413, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970); Pines v. Perssion,
111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Wis. 1961). Two decisions describe the tenant's remedies
under the implied warranty theory as being the normal remedies for breach of con-
tract, which would seem to encompass payment of only the reasonable rental value.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072; Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d
470, 475 (Hawaii 1969). In fact a few jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold that
the implied warranty of habitability concept grants the tenant a cause of action to
recover the difference between the rent agreed and the reasonable rental value. Kline v.
Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 274 A.2d 865, 868
(N.J. Dist. Ct. 1971).
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The implied warranty of habitability theory has distinct advantages
over the illegal contract theory. In addition to covering housing code
violations whenever they occur, as opposed to those known to be in
existence at the creation of the contract, the implied warranty theory
does not require termination of the tenancy. Although the theory of
implied warranty may be more useful than the illegal contract theory,
it, too, is seriously deficient. The standard for determining whether
there is a breach of the implied warranty requires that there be a sub-
stantial violation of the housing codes. The tenant who chooses to with-
hold his rent must first determine whether a particular defect or condi-
tion is substantial, and then must hope a court will concur. The lack
of definite judicial standards for determining the existence of substantial
violations42 of the housing codes necessitates risky guesswork for the low
income tenant.43
3. Statutory Rent Abatement
Statutory rent abatement has been utilized in a few jurisdictions to
allow tenants to remain in possession of leased housing without payment
of rent or payment of rent in a reduced amount until housing code viola-
42. The court in determining whether a housing code violation is substantial enough
to justify rent withholding must consider the seriousness of the defect, the length of
time it has persisted, and its effect on the tenant's own dwelling unit or the common
areas he uses. Hinson v. Dells, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666
(1972). This criterion is far less explicit than those used in rent escrow schemes
wherein the typical statute specifically sets out what housing code violations will allow
the tenant to utilize the rent escrow mechanism. On the other hand, the New Jersey
statute includes
any other condition or conditions in substantial violation of the standards of
fitness for human habitation established under State or local housing or health
codes or regulations or any other condition dangerous to life, health or safety.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-88 (Supp. 1973). Thus, although the statute is explicit
when it lists particular housing code violations, it does not exclude other grounds.
The same is true of the New York statute. N.Y. REAL PRop. ACTIONS LAw § 770
(McKinney Supp. 1972-1973).
43. It is important to recognize that the tenant may be subjected to more than just
payment of rent and the inconvenience of moving. Court costs, attorney fees, and
statutory penalties are not unusual. California, for example, provides that where the
tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer and malice is shown, he may be subjected to
treble damages. CAL. CODE CrV. PRO. § 1174 (West 1972). Conceptually, a misin-
formed tenant could behave belligerently, but whether this would be enough to con-
stitute malice is purely speculative. It is debatable, however, whether these penalties,
resulting from uncertainty as to what constitutes a substantial violation of the housing
codes, are actually effectual. It can be argued that at worst a tenant will lose, the
landlord will be granted an unenforceable judgment, and the tenant will move to hous-
ing no better, but presumably no worse, than he faced previously. If the tenant is
indigent, at least, the effect of any monetary penalty will be substantially reduced.
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tions are corrected.44  If the leased premises are in substantial viola-
tion4 5 of the housing code and if the tenant has withheld rent, the statu-
tory rent abatement scheme allows the condition of the premises to be
offered as a defense to either an action of eviction or an action for rent.40
For example, the Michigan statutory scheme requires every lease of
residential property to contain a covenant that the premises are habitable
and that the lessor will keep them in repair.4r It further provides that,
when the lessor sues for possession based on nonpayment of rent, judg-
ment shall not be granted in favor of the lessor if he has breached a
covenant of the lease which excuses payment of rent.48 The breach of
a covenant to repair by a lessor is the type of breach which excuses
payment of rent by the tenant.49
Statutory rent abatement schemes have the potential for providing a
workable definition of what constitutes a "substantial" violation of the
housing code. Instead, those presently in force merely imply a war-
ranty of habitability in residential leasesP0 and thus offer no clearer
criteria than the illegal contract theory or the implied warranty of habit-
ability theory.
4. Rent Abatement Unsanctioned By Law
Rent abatement occurs whenever a tenant, remaining in possession
of rental property, withholds rental payments because of housing code
violations. 1 It could involve either a single tenant withholding rent or
the more dramatic situation in which a number of tenants withhold rent-
al payments in unison, i.e., a rent strike. It could even involve the
withholding of rent by a tenant despite the failure of the courts and the
legislature to recognize the violation of the housing code by the lessor
as a defense in an eviction action or an action for rent. The difference
between this type of rent abatement and the previous methods is that
44. The following jurisdictions have rent abatement statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-24 (1960), § 47-24b (Supp. 1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Supp.
1973). California has a bill now pending in the state assembly. A.B. Cal. Legis.,
Reg. Sess. 1202 (1973). These statutes implement statutory rent abatement by
implying a warranty of habitability in residential leases.
45. See note 42 supra.
46. See note 44 supra.
47. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1109(1)(b) (1970).
48. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Supp. 1973).
49. Rome v. Walker, 19 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
50. See note 44 supra. A discussion of the lack of definite standards to determine
whether rent withholding is justified is contained in note 42 supra.
51. See text immediately following note 29 supra.
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in time52 the landlord would eventually prevail,53 but as long as the
tenants remain in possession without paying rent, rent abatement un-
sanctioned by law has the same effect on the cash flow of rental in-
come as any other method of rent abatement, v,4
B. Rent Escrow Method
The second type of rent withholding is the rent escrow method. This
method diverts rental property cash flow from the landlord to a third
party. The third party may be the court itself or a court appointed
receiver. 55
In many jurisdictions, agencies which enforce housing codes have
long enjoyed the power to obtain a court order requiring the owner to
comply with code standards. Should the landlord fail to respond to
the order, the agency or a court appointed receiver can take control of
the building and correct housing code deficiencies.56 This power to
control the premises includes the collection of rental payments and the
application of them to the cost of the repairs.57 If the rental payments
prove insufficient, the building is not repaired.58
A more recent development in some jurisdictions, is the grant to the
tenant of standing to maintain an action requiring the landlord to com-
ply with the housing code.5 9 This also permits the tenants to deposit
52. The time span of a normal civil action is reduced [in an unlawful detainer
action] by the following procedural peculiarities: (1) the tenant is required to
appear and plead within five days after service of the summons, rather than within
the usual 30-day period (CCP § 1167); (2) precedence is given to unlawful de-
tainer actions over all other pending civil actions (CCP § 1179a); (3) the right
to assert a cross-complaint or counterclaim is denied; and (4) a stay on appeal is
discretionary with the trial court judge (CCP § 1176).
M. MosKovriz, P. HONIGSBERG & D. FINKELSTXN, CALIFoRNA EVICION DEFENSE
MANUAL 5 (1971). In California, the unlawful detainer procedure is outlined in CAL.
CODE CIr. PRO. §§ 1159-1179(a) (West 1967).
53. This statement assumes the landlord will undertake eviction action and that the
judiciary does not adopt one of the other theories of rent abatement, such as the
illegal contract theory or the implied warranty of habitability theory, thus sanctioning
the tenant's action.
54. TENANT MoEMmrN, supra note 10, at 652-53.
55. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347n (Supp. 1973) (allows payment to a
receiver); MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111 § 1271 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-79
to 82 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 771(2), 778 (McKinney
Supp. 1972-1973) (third party is court itself).
56. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1973). See also
PA. STAT. ANN. art. 35 § 1700-1 (Supp. 1973-1974).
57. See note 56 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 134-36 infra.
59. The following jurisdictions give a tenant standing to initiate a rent escrow:
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111 § 127H (Supp. 1972); N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 2A:42-88
(Supp. 1973). The proposed model landlord-tenant code adopted the approach of
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the rental payments with the court or a court appointed receiver.00
Some jurisdictions require the tenant to demonstrate that certain specific
violations of the housing code exist such as a lack of heat, water, elec-
tricity, or sewage disposal.61 Before the initiation of the rent escrow,
a hearing is usually held to determine whether the landlord has indeed
failed to provide essential services.62  If judgment is rendered in favor
of the tenant, the rent is deposited with the court or court appointed re-
ceiver until the landlord complies with housing code standards.08 As
long as the tenant continues to pay rent in escrow, the landlord has no
cause of action to evict the tenant for nonpayment.6 4 The court may
also empower the receiver to make and finance the necessary repairs
with escrowed rental payments.65 Upon completion of the repairs and
repayment of the expenses of rehabilitation, the building and the sur-
plus of the rent escrow are returned to the owner.66
The rent escrow approach can be distinguished from the rent abate-
ment approach. First, under the rent escrow approach a hearing is re-
quired prior to the initiation of withholding, 67 and thus the tenant knows
in advance that his action is statutorily condoned. Under a rent abate-
ment scheme, however, the tenant is forced to act without prior judicial
endorsement and must hope a court will ultimately concur68 A second
difference is that the rent escrow approach does not stop the cash flow
of rental income as does the rent abatement approach, although, ad-
mittedly, it does interrupt the flow to the landlord.
giving the tenant standing to initiate a rent escrow. AMEMCAN BAR FOUNDATION,
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 3-301 (Tent. Draft 1969). Two juris-
dictions allow tenants to initiate rent escrow but only where there is a petition by a
specified proportion of the total tenants. New York requires one third of the tenants
to join in the petition. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAw § 770 (McKinney Supp. 1972-
1973). Connecticut requires "a majority or more of the tenants" to join in the
petition. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347k (Supp. 1973).
60. See note 59 supra.
61. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONs LAW § 770 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1973); N.Y.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-88 (Supp. 1973).
62. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-93(b) (Supp. 1973).
63. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347n (Supp. 1973); N.Y STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:42-92 (Supp. 1973).
64. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347o (Supp. 1973).
65. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347n (Supp. 1973); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:42-93 (Supp. 1973). This particular section of the New Jersey statute allows
the owner to petition to perform the repairs himself.
66. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347n (Supp. 1973).
67. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:42-93(b) (Supp. 1973).
68. The tenant could bring an action for declaratory relief under a rent abatement
scheme. See Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
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RENT WITHHOLDING
From the standpoint of the landlord, the rent abatement approach,
which entirely stops the cash flow of rental income, is a harsher remedy.
From the standpoint of the tenant, rent abatement entails greater risks
because of the uncertainty as to whether or not his complaint will fall
within judicially interpreted criteria.
I. EcoNoMIc IMPACT OF RENT WITHHOLDING
Rent withholding must be viewed from the context of the housing
market to appreciate its potential impact. A number of studies in urban
areas have indicated that substandard housing is concentrated in low
income residential areas.69 A determination of the extent to which rent
withholding can successfully coerce landlords into compliance with hous-
ing codes must be based on an understanding of the nature of the housing
market in low income areas.
A. Housing Market In Low Income Areas
With the migration of middle income families to the suburbs, the hous-
ing stock in low income areas has undergone significant change.70  Pre-
viously isolated high income residential areas have tended to lose value
and have also experienced a decline in rent levels as their distance from
low income areas has narrowed. 71 With the reduction of the price dif-
ferential between the high and low income neighborhoods, a cycle of
expansion of low income areas has developed. 72 Unless equilibrium
is reached between high and low income areas, the unstable market will
allow continued expansion of low income areas.
73
This process of gradual expansion of low income areas into what
was previously a middle class area has occurred in a number of cities. 74
The process has been especially dramatic in St. Louis, Missouri where
in the twenty year period, 1950-1970, the net migration from the city
amounted to 400,000 people. 75 One study confirming this was con-
69. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 86; REAL ESTATE, supra note 2, at 14.
70. Cf. Mandelker, The Local Community's Strike in Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN
LAw. 601, 602 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mandelker].
71. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 88.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 88-89.
74. Cf. SURVEy OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 77-78 (dealing with black
migration to the inner urban ghetto); HUD, supra note 21, at 29; URBAN DECAY, supra
note 2, at 54-55. The cities examined in these studies included: Chicago, Cleveland,
Detroit, Hoboken, New Orleans, New York, and St. Louis.
75. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 54-55. There are a number of social factors
which have intensified the migration of the middle income families to the suburbs.
The most significant factor has been race. As black families have moved into areas
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ducted by the Institute for Urban and Regional Studies of Washington
University.76 It observed an area comprised of a number of streets which
intersected low and middle income areas 77 and measured the changes in
relative income of tenants, rental payments required, and housing qual-
ity. The study indicated a steady expansion of low income areas, de-
creasing rent levels as middle income areas were gradually absorbed
into low income areas, and wide scale deterioration in the housing
stock.7 8 The results indicated that forty-three per cent of all dwelling
units condemned in the city between 1969 and 1971 were located in a
single test area.7
9
The available evidence therefore suggests that there is a decline in the
quality of housing during the transition from a middle income to a low
income area.8 ° This is due to the fact that the market response to a fall
in rental income is an attempt to cut costs,8' and the cost of mainte-
nance experiences the greatest reduction, since it is the only unfixed
cost.8" A decrease in maintenance obviously results in a decline in
adjoining middle income areas, migration of the white middle class has accelerated.
Moore, Livingston & Galland, Woodlmvn, 30 PUB. INTEREST 41, 42 (1973); [herein-
after cited as Woodlawn]. REAL ESTATE, supra note 2, at 13-14; cf. URBAN DECAY,
supra note 2, at 54-55. Migration to the suburbs has also been motivated by the
increasing crime rate and vandalism of housing associated with low income areas.
HUD, supra note 2, at 235; Woodlawn, supra, at 46; URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at
72. The conditions of the neighborhood have a significant impact on the decision by
middle income families to migrate to the suburbs. These same conditions may also
have a significant impact on the decision of the landlord to rehabilitate. See TENEMENT
LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 155-63; G. STE.NLIEB, ABANDONMENT AND REHABILrA-
TION, PAPERS SUBMITTED TO SUBCOMMITIE ON HOUSINo PANELS ON HOUSING PRODUC-
noN, HOUSING DEMAND, AND DEVELOPING A SUITABLE LIvING ENVIRONMENT, pL 1,
H.R. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 316 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABANDONMENT AM
REiABILITATION].
76. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2.
77. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 91-102.
78. Id. The study focused on widely separated blocks along a number of chosen
streets. As expected, the twenty year trend of lower income tenant occupancy, lower
rent levels, and declining housing quality was observed first in those blocks which were
closer to the low income area. Those blocks further from the original low income
areas were affected by the same trend at a later date. Id.
79. Id. at 98.
80. The quality of housing is dependent upon rental income generated. The higher
the rental income, the more the landlord will have to spend on rehabilitation. See
S. PARRArT, HOUSING CODE ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT 39 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT].
81. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CENTRAL CITY
PROBLEM AND URBAN RENEwAL POLICY, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as LIBRARY OF CONGRESS]; SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 86-87.
82. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 57.
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housing quality,83 and as rental income continues to decrease, the rate
of deterioration is accelerated. As the low income area gradually en-
gulfs a middle income area, the low income tenant may receive a tem-
porary rise in the quality of housing. 4 With the lack of maintenance,
however, he eventually inhabits a substandard building. 5
In addition to the potential income of rental property decreasing as
areas change from middle income to low income, the actual income of
the property decreases even further because of widespread vacancies.88
These vacancies occur because the emigration of middle income families
exceeds the immigration of low income families.8
7
The situation of the owner of rental property has become desperate.
Coupled with income decrease has been an inability to liquidate invest-
ment. In a normal real estate market, the landlord could sell or refinance
his property and realize a return on his investment.88 The housing mar-
ket in low income areas, however, is such that neither the resale of the
property 9 nor the refinancing of the mortgage by the lending institu-
tion90 is an available option. With the transition of central urban areas
from middle to low income family use, there has come a decline in in-
come from rental property coupled with substantial deterioration of the
quality of the property. The landlord in a low income area can neither
sell nor refinance his rental property.91 He is locked into an insoluble
dilemma.
83. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 89. Older houses need more maintenance to
remain in good condition. Thus the decrease in level of maintenance is particularly
disastrous for an older house. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 56-57.
84. KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 95.
85. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 89-90.
86. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
87. HUD, supra note 21, at 67. The low income tenant may gain a temporary
rise in the quality of housing, but a lack of maintenance soon dissipates this gain. See
text accompanying note 84 supra. The gradual filtering of houses from middle income
families to low income families provides the low income tenant with a house which,
if not already deteriorated, is well on its way. See TENEmENT LANDLORD, supra note
13, at 8. A housing study in St. Louis found that forty percent of all housing occupied
by non-whites in low income areas was substandard. SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra
note 1, at 21. Paradoxically, in a number of low income areas experiencing widespread
vacancies there is also widespread overcrowding. Low income tenants are often too
poor and the size of their families often too great to be properly housed in existing
units. In St. Louis, for example, twenty-eight percent of the occupied dwelling units
are overcrowded. SURvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 21.
88. SURVEY OF ABANDONmENT, supra note 1, at 85.
89. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 107; HUD, supra note 21, at 121,
173.
90. KAIsER REPORT, supra note 3, at 96; SURVEY OF ABANDoNm NT, supra note 1,
at 88-89; See text accompanying notes 109-111 infra.
91. The low income housing market described above is applicable to many but not
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B. Impact of Rent Abatement
From a legal perspective, rent abatement is merely another adjunct
to housing code enforcement. 92 Rent abatement is an attempt to coerce
the owner of rental property into performing repairs sufficient to comply
with housing code standards by cutting off the cash flow of rental in--
come to the landlord.93
Housing code enforcement programs for low income housing have
often been predicated on the assumption that slumlords were reaping
huge profits from low income tenants.94 If this assumption were accu-
rate, these programs would be successful in rehabilitating the low income
property by diverting a portion of the slumlords' high profit margin to
maintenance. 95 It is no longer true, however, that large scale operators
control the low income rental housing market.9 6 The actual landlords
of low income property fall into three basic categories: elderly, small-
scale absentee, and ethnic minorities.97 Contrary to the slumlord myth
the vast majority of these owners do not realize substantial profits.98
An important factor affecting the profit margin of low income hous-
ing is the necessary operating cost, which includes expenditures for
property taxes, utilities, insurance, management costs, nominal mainte-
all cities in the United States. Significantly, some cities have been subject to counter-
vailing forces such as social and economic integration creating a more stable housing
market. SuRvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
92. Bross, Law Reform Man Meets the Slumlord, 3 URBAN LAW. 609, 619-20
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Law Reform Man]. Rent withholding, in general, shares
the same goal and standards as conventional housing code enforcement programs (see
text accompanying note 42 supra), but rent withholding is initiated by the tenant not
by an administrative agency, and rent withholding, unlike conventional programs, de-
prives the landlord of rental income. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
94. ABANDONMENT AND RmBiLITATION, supra note 75, at 316-17.
95. Id.
96. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 317; LIBRARY OF CONoRESS,
supra note 81, at 104; HUD, supra note 21, at 51-52. In a 1966 study of Newark,
New Jersey, George Sternlieb found that over forty percent of slum properties were
held by landlords who owned no other property while less than twenty-five percent of
the landlords owned over six slum parcels. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at
122. Sternlieb indicated that over twenty-five percent of the landlords were over sixty
years of age. He also noted that thirty-three percent of slum properties were owned
by black people, and thirty-seven percent of the parcels were owned by resident land-
lords. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 131. Large scale management of
slum property is considered to be an essential prerequisite for efficient operation in
all phases of the low income rental property market, including maintenance. F. CASE,
INNER-CITY Housn~o AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 153 (1972) [hereinafter cited as INNER-
CITY HOUSING].
97. ABANDONMENT AND REI ABILITATION, supra note 75, at 317-18.
98. See text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.
1974] RENT WITHHOLDING
nance, and mortgage payments. George Stemlieb, in a 1966 study of
Newark, New Jersey, found that the operating cost of low income hous-
ing, not even considering mortgage payments, absorbed approximately
61% of all rental income.99 While it is difficult to determine the nor-
mal operating cost for low income property, a number of recent studies
have demonstrated that the operating expenses in all categories on an
absolute scale are increasing faster' 00 than rental income.101 The most
dramatic increase has been in the cost of maintenance. One recent na-
tional survey of low income housing conducted by the National Urban
League found that maintenance costs alone are increasing at the rate
of three to six per cent annually.0 2 This same study also determined
that increasing vandalism has quadrupled maintenance expenses in a
number of low income areas. 0 3
In addition, the landlord in low income areas confronts an increasing
vacancy problem. In many low income areas vacancies run as high as
eighteen to twenty-five per cent of the total dwelling units, 04 reducing
further the rental income received by the landlord.
Two recent studies conducted by the National Urban League and the
Institute for Urban and Regional Studies of Washington University both
conclude that landlords of low income rental property in most areas
have reduced or totally curtailed maintenance in order to reduce costs
99. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 78.
100. Property taxes in low income areas absorb from seventeen to twenty-five
percent of gross rent. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 328.
Property taxes in New York City, for example, are increasing at the rate of four to
six percent annually. SURvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 90. Insurance is
often not available in low income areas, and even when it is, the cost is extremely
high. HUD, supra note 21, at 120. Insurance rates in St. Louis low income areas
were found to be increasing at the rate of seven percent annually. Id. at 59. Capital
is important to rental property, for substantial mortgages are normally needed.
Presently, capital is not available in low income areas in most cases. See text ac-
companying notes 109-11 infra. As the interest rate increases, the effect on low
income property will become even more evident. ABANDONMENT AND RmAB ILTATION,
supra note 75, at 340.
101. SuRvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 93; Woodlawn, supra note 75, at
46.
102. SuRvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 90. One case study indicated an
increase in the cost of maintenance of eight percent annually. HUD, supra note 21,
at 67.
103. SuvEy OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 86. This drastic increase in
maintenance costs was verified in case studies conducted by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. HUD, supra note 21, at 55, 116.
104. Sternlieb noted that vacancies in Newark, New Jersey were eighteen percent of
the dwelling units. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 93. In two other
case studies vacancy rates of twenty-five percent were noted. HUD, supra note 21, at
67-68, 122.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
and to continue receiving a return on their investment. 105 Such evidence
demonstrates that the landlord of low income property is in the midst of
a cost squeeze; he is without sufficient income to meet the needs of even
nominal maintenance, much less to make the repairs required by the
housing codes.10
In considering the ability of the landlord to conform to housing code
standards, the cost of compliance must be included. As the report of
the President's Committee on Urban Housing indicates, the cost of re-
habilitation averages about $9,000 per dwelling unit, 0 7 which in many
instances exceeds the market value of the property. 0 8
The large amounts of capital necessary to comply with housing code
standards can only be provided by outside financing. This financing
of repairs requires either that new mortgages be placed on the property
or that old loans be recast.109 Unfortunately, financial institutions have
adopted a policy known as "redlining" which provides no new financial
assistance within low income areas." 0' Where loans have been made
105. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 81, at 104; URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at
56-57; SURVEy OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 86. In a number of low income
areas, even if maintenance were completely curtailed, the landlord could not break
even. SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 34; HUD, supra note 21, at
67, 113. One study indicated that in at least seven percent of the housing stock of
New York, the curtailment of maintenance is taking place. This statistic includes low,
middle, and high income family dwellings. SURvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at
15.
106. Without maintenance, the property will completely deteriorate in a short time.
A reduction in maintenance is only a temporary means by which the landlord can
continue to receive income from the property. This postpones, but does not pre-
vent, abandonment in many cases. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 81, at 104;
URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at 56-57; SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at
86. This curtailment of maintenance can also be viewed as a form of disinvestment
in which the landlord attempts to recapture his investment before he walks away. SuR-
vET OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 15.
107. KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 101. These figures are taken from data
collected on rehabilitation costs only in low income areas.
108. See ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 321; BOSTON
MUNICIPAL RESEARCH BUREAU, CosTs AND OTHER EFFEcrs ON OwNERs AND TENANTS
OF REPAIRS REQUIRED UNDER HoUsNG CODE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS pt. I, at 3
(1968). [hereinafter cited as COSTS AND OTHER EFFECTS ON OwNERS]. There are
also non-monetary costs of rehabilitation. The duration of loans required to finance
housing code enforcement is likely to exceed the expected life of the premises. ABAN-
DONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 322. Rehabilitation may be wasteful
if the neighborhood is without potential. KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 104-05.
109. Cf. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 318.
110. KAISER REPORT, upra note 3, at 96; SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1,
at 90; ABANDONMENT AND REHABrrATION, supra note 75, at 318; HUD, supra note
21, at 238. Numerous reasons for the trend of disinvestment by lending institutions
have been noted. Primarily, there has been a limited supply of capital to meet the
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for low income property, the terms have included a high rate of interest
over a short period of time.'11
Because of insufficient rent and high rehabilitation costs, the landlord
faced with housing code enforcement is forced to increase rents if he is
to maintain a positive return on his low income property.1 2  This is a
result which few low income tenants desire or can afford." 3 The ability
of low income tenants to pay increased rent, of course, is limited. It has
been demonstrated that rents in low income areas often are tied not to
the quality of the housing, but to the financial capability of the ten-
ant." 4  An increase in the quality of housing by no means insures
that the landlord can successfully demand an increase in the monthly
rent. Thus, the landlord who must comply with housing code stand-
ards is faced with an intractable economic situation. The landlord who
is forced to comply with housing codes under a rent abatement scheme,
however, is faced with an even more difficult problem because his
cash flow of rental income has been -terminated.
Rent abatement, like other means of housing code enforcement, places
a significant number of the landlords of low income property in the posi-
tion of having to abandon their property."15  Although housing code
high demand. In addition, other investments are more attractive because low income
areas involve high risks. SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 89. Another
reason for disinvestment has been the decline in the value of the property relative to
existing mortgages. Decreasing property values indicate potential risk often prohibited
by the regulations which govern lending institutions. Woodlawn, supra note 75, at
47-48. Even when regulations have not prohibited loans in many low income areas,
the Federal Home Loan Bank has required the lenders to retain extra reserves to
protect against the risk of loss threatened by too many loans in these areas of low in-
come. This has the effect of decreasing capital available for lending. The reaction of
the lenders has been to avoid making loans in these areas. URBAN DECAY, supra note 2,
at 58 n.6.
111. SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 90.
112. SAN FRANcisco PLANNING AND URBAN RENEWAL ASSOCIATION, A SPUR REPORT
ON THE SAN FRANcIsco REDEVELOPMENT PRocEss 6 (1972); HOUSING CODE ENFORCE-
MENT, supra note 80, at 39; L. KEYES, THE REHABILITATION PLANNING GAME 8 (1969);
KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 106; DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 15, at 286; ABAN-
DONMENT AND RmiARILiTATIoN, supra note 75, at 322. A study conducted by the
Boston Municipal Research Bureau concluded that increases forced by housing code
enforcement often place the rent above the going market rate for similar accommoda-
tions. COsTs AND OTHER EFFECrS ON OwNERS, supra note 108, pt. H1 at 1.
113. See note 80 supra.
114. A study conducted in Columbus, Ohio found that rents in low income areas
are tied to the ability of tenants to pay. Property improvement in low income areas
did not increase rental income. T. Vaughn, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Low
Income Areas, in SoCIAL PROBLEMS 212-13 (1968); See also KAISER REPORT, supra note
3, at 104; HousING CODE ENFORCEmENT, supra note 80, at 41.
115. Abandonment is a process which includes more than buildings vacated by their
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enforcement is not the sole cause of abandonment, n0 it has served as
the decision point at which abandonment has been perceived as the
only alternative. 11
7
The potential acceleration in the rate of abandonment because of
housing code enforcement programs cannot be minimized. The phenom-
enon has been documented in a number of studies throughout the
country.11 8 Chicago demonstrates the effect a stringent code enforce-
ment program can have on the rate of abandonment. As many as four
thousand units per year were demolished under the code enforcement
program because the owners decided that abandonment was econom-
ically more feasible than rehabilitation." 9
Abandonment would not be as serious a condition if it could be
viewed as the end product of a long filtering process of housing from
high income family use to low income family use by which the poor
were able to occupy better housing and discard that of the poorest
landlords. It also involves an intermediate step where the landlord does not continue
to provide services and does not pay taxes or mortgages. This disinvestment of the
landlord is the essence of abandonment. SutvEy OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 6.
116. Previous discussion of the low income housing market outlined the major
socio-economic factors which are significant in creating conditions resulting in abandon-
ment. See note 75 supra.
117. "The owner faced with code enforcement with a limited rent horizon simply
will not make the investment but rather will walk away from the parcel." ABANDON-
mENT AND REHABLITATiON, supra note 75, at 323. This conclusion was also reached
in a number of other studies and articles. DOUGLAS REPORT, .supra note 15, at 286;
Grigsby, supra note 12, at 535; HoUsINo CODE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 80, at 42;
HUD, supra note 21, at 237; SuRVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 64; LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, supra note 81, at 62.
118. SuRvEy OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 6; HUD, supra note 21, at 7;
ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 330. The cities covered in
these studies included Chicago, Detroit, Hoboken, New York and St. Louis. One
study of four low income areas in Philadelphia, where concentrated code enforcement
programs were initiated, disclosed increased abandonment in only one area. Law
Reform Man, supra note 92, at 625. Most landlords in the Philadelphia areas studied
had no mortgage payments to cut down on rental income, and these areas have very
low housing density. Thus the areas studied seem to be atypical. See ABANDONMENT
AND REHABIurATioN, supra note 75, at 334-35; HUD, supra note 21, at 234-35. The
author of the study in Philadelphia confirms the point discussed earlier in note 64
supra that it is a mistake to assume that all low income areas are alike. Law Reform
Man, supra note 92, at 627.
119. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 326. The National
Urban League found in its study, that in St. Louis sixteen percent of the structures
in the low income areas studied were abandoned. SuRvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra
note 1, at 15. This sixteen percent figure does not take into account more than 24,000
building demolitions over the last decade, many of which were demolished because they
were abandoned. HUD, supra note 21, at 82.
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quality.120 The problem is that abandonment is not selective; it affects
not only the lowest quality housing, but also essentially sound housing
easily capable of rehabilitation.' 21 The real tragedy of abandonment is
that in many cases low income families are forced to move to housing
which is of lesser quality than that which has been abandoned. 122 Unless
there is a neat correlation between the most aggressive tenants and the
lowest quality housing, rent withholding can only serve to aggravate the
abandonment problem.
Abandonment is dangerous not only because it destroys basically
sound housing, but also because it adversely affects the surrounding
neighborhood. "Whe process of abandonment, while in part caused by
area characteristics, in turn engenders a degeneration of the same
area." 23 The dynamic nature of the process of abandonment has been
described in a study by the National Urban League as "an aspect of a
socially destructive process that makes entire neighborhoods and, in
some cases, entire cities uninhabitable.'.
24
The potential consequences of a legal action forcing compliance with
housing codes by utilizing rent withholding cannot be ignored. 25  To
tenants as well as landlords, rent increases and housing abandonment
are unacceptable results. 26
120. ABANDONMENT AND REHABiTATION, supra note 75, at 315-16.
121. See SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 6; ABANDONMENT AND RE-
HABILITATION, supra note 75, at 316; HOusING CODn ENFORCEMENT, supra note 80,
at 50.
122. SURVEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 6.
123. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 330.
124. SuRvEY OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 6. See also HUD, supra note 21,
at 7.
125. Abandonment is not a desirable result when the goal attempted to be achieved
is rehabilitation of existing housing. If the goal is complete demolition of housing in
an urban renewal area, abandonment may allow the urban renewal agency to acquire
the property at little or no cost. This acquisition of property through housing code
enforcement which leads to abandonment would reduce one of the major costs of
urban renewal projects, that of land acquisition. Whether this procedure would
amount to a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the fifth
and/or fourteenth amendments is a question beyond the scope of the article.
126. Abandonment reduces the number of dwellings available to the low income
tenant. This is especially problematic in an area where the overall supply of low
income housing is tight. This problem was observed in a study of Sacramento, Cali-
fornia. F. CASE, C. ELIAS, JR., W. HIPPAKA, S. LANE & W. SMITH, HOUSING THE
UNDERHOUSED: THE CALIFORNIA STUDIES ch. VI, at 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CAL.
STUDIES]. It should be noted that the short supply of low income housing in Sacra-
mento is probably not typical of low income areas, for vacancies may run as high as
twenty-five percent. See text accompanying note 104 supra. Although vacancies often
exist, there is never an oversupply of low income housing meeting housing code
standards. See note 87 supra.
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C. Impact of Rent Escrow
Like rent abatement, rent escrow is a mechanism for housing code
enforcement. 2 7  In contrast, however, it attempts to force compliance
with housing codes by diverting rental income from the landlord to a
court or a court appointed receiver. 28  Although rent escrow programs
are not as harsh as rent abatement programs, they similarly effect the
precipitation of rent increases and/or the abandonment of property.12
Notwithstanding these similar results, the management of rental property
by a court or a court appointed receiver creates unique difficulties.
A major problem with rent escrow programs is the time lag between
the initiation of the rent escrow and the completion of rehabilitation.
Because the cash flow of rental income is negligible, buildings are often
never brought up to housing code standards.' 30 This situation was en-
countered in a New York receivership program in which eighteen build-
ings were placed in receivership.'' Of these, thirteen will never pay
for themselves, and five will do so only after an extended period of
time.' 32  As these results demonstrate, once the receiver makes repairs
sufficient to meet housing code standards, he must operate the buildings
for an indefinite period before the expenses of rehabilitation are reim-
bursed. 133 In a situation where a receiver has been in control of rental
property for a number of years, the owner is often unwilling to reassume
control. The experience in Connecticut has been that by appointment
of a receiver, "the courts often order, indirectly the owner's abandon-
ment of the property.' 4  The failure to rehabilitate a significant num-
ber of buildings, to repay the cost of rehabilitation in those eventually
repaired, and to avoid municipal acquisition of slum property38r has
127. See note 93 supra.
128. See text immediately following note 29 supra.
129. Since rent escrow and rent abatement are merely different types of housing
code enforcement mechanisms, the analysis of the preceeding section on the impact
of rent abatement is equally applicable to rent escrow programs. A rent escrow is
not as harsh a remedy as rent abatement, however, since the rental income is still
available for use in rehabilitation. See text accompanying notes 92-126 supra.
130. ABANDONmENT AND REHABILTATIoN, supra note 75, at 326.
131. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1964, at 1, col. 1.
132. Id.
133. TENANT MOVEMENT, supra note 10, at 660; cf. ABANDONMENT AND REInAnILITA-
ION, supra note 75, at 326.
134. Keating -& Heskin, Rent Withholding: Recent Legislative Developments,
5 CLEARiNGHOUSE REV. 728, 730 (1971).
135. The result of rent escrow programs has proven to be the eventual ownership
of property by the municipal government. ABANDONmENT AND RmABmLrrATON, supra
note 75, at 326. The Chicago experience indicates that municipal management of prop-
erty under receivership has failed. Frequently, financial difficulty has allowed rehabili-
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persuaded local Connecticut governments to abandon rent escrow pro-
grams.1
36
The use of rent escrow programs has also increased the investment
risks of institutions which finance low income property. Often the ren-
tal income is insufficient to meet the expense of repair, and mortgage
payments must be utilized to help meet this cost. 137 While such use may
give the receiver more working capital, it has the effect of increasing
the risk in financing low income property. As noted previously, the
lack of institutional financing in low income areas is a significant factor
contributing to the present unstable low income housing market.13 8 In-
creasing the risk of financing low income property can only further con-
tribute to an unstable market condition. 139
Rent escrow, in addition to increasing rents and abandonment, has
proved impractical because of significant time delays and deterrence of
institutional financing in low income areas. The unanticipated result
has been that rent escrow, like rent abatement, has not provided low in-
come tenants with a solution to substandard housing.
IV. POLICY CHANGES FOR MoRE EFFECTIVE HOUSING
CODE ENFORCEMENT
Since the impact of rent withholding threatens results unacceptable
to either the landlord or the tenant, it is evident that governmental policy
changes are appropriate. The solution necessarily must include a plan
for effective housing code enforcement which will benefit the tenant,
without forcing the landlord to abandon.
tated property to quickly fall into disrepair eventually leading to abandonment. Suwvy
OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 42. It has become evident that some cities cannot
afford to acquire possession of the property because of a loss in tax revenue. These
cities will sacrifice enforcement of housing codes if it means removing property from
the market. SuRvEy OF ABANDONMENT, supra note 1, at 48.
136. TENANT MovEMENT, supra note 10, at 660. Connecticut housing authorities
decided not to utilize rent escrow in the enforcement of housing codes. The statute
involved was similar to rent escrow statutes with the exception that rent escrow statutes
grant the tenant standing to initiate rent escrow. See text accompanying notes 56-59
supra.
137. TENANT MovEMENT, supra note 10, at 660. Even by using the money normally
paid to the mortgage holder, working capital may still be insufficient.
The use of rent for rehabilitation, rather than for payment of mortgages, is often the
result of priority contests. The issue of these contests is whether or not the mortgagee's
claim should be subordinated to that of the receiver who became indebted in the
rehabilitation of the rental property. TENANT MOVEmENT, supra note 10, at 660.
In Connecticut a lien is placed on all rents until the cost of rehabilitation is recaptured.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347c (1969).
138. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
139. See Woodlawn, supra note 75, at 47-48.
19741
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
Presently, the most prohibitive barrier to effective code enforcement
is the inflexible nature of the housing codes. They apply the same cri-
teria both to existing housing and to housing under construction.' 40
This uniform set of standards governs every house, regardless of age or
of the physical and economic condition of the neighborhood.' 41 The
very requirement of such high standards deters rehabilitation. 42
Two approaches would provide a more viable set of standards for
housing code enforcement. Initially, the development of two housing
codes, one for existing housing and another for housing being con-
structed, 4 3 would reduce the cost of rehabilitation, and provide a more
realistic standard. A second approach would be to require correction
only of those defects which could be repaired at a reasonable expense.' 44
This would not sanction unsafe housing and in fact is the type of flexi-
ble housing code enforcement effectively employed in Great Britain.' 4"
When a neighborhood is in need of total rehabilitation, the English
mobilize short term improvements until the larger task is completed.' 40
This procedure enjoys the dual advantage of maximizing the utility of
investment and reducing rehabilitation cost.'47
The adoption of a more reasonable set of housing codes will not only
140. Curry, The Federal Role in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAw. 567,
569 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL ROLE]. Housing codes written mainly for
new construction purposes can contain such provisions as the distance between studs,
which for the rehabilitation of a building is irrelevant. Also they often ignore items
important to a low income tenant such as rodent control. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra
note 13, at 233; Grigsby, supra note 12, at 53.
141. Grigsby, supra note 12, at 535. Housing codes do not consider the hidden
costs of rehabilitating a building which because of its age is not utilized in the most
efficient manner. See note 108 supra.
142. ABANDONMENT AND REmBiLrrATiON, supra note 75, at 321-22. See text ac-
companying note 107 supra.
143. The Department of Housing and Urban Development is presently considering
the use of two housing codes. FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 140, at 569; see HUD,
supra note 21, at 277; URBAN DECAY, supra note 2, at xix.
144. 1 NEw YORK STATE DVISIoN OF HOUSING, HOUSING CODES 79 (1960). A
number of factors could be introduced to determine what is a reasonable expense,
including the cost of the repairs needed, the value of the property, and the physical
and economic condition of the neighborhood.
145. Id.
146. Mandelker, supra note 70, at 604. implicit in this type of system is the
recognition that housing code enforcement is not enough. One study proposed that
in some areas the best approach would be to require only stopgap repairs. J. SLAVET &
M. LEViN, NEw APPROACHES TO HOUSING CODE ADMINISTRATION 28 (1969). Slavet and
Levin suggest this solution but caution that stopgap repairs "shouldn't be used as a
permanent substitute for or as an alternative to renewal." Id. (footnote omitted).
147. The administrative problem would be greatly increased because of the flexible
nature of the standards. ABANDONMENT AND REHAB rrATIoN, supra note 75, at 323.
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affect the viability of conventional housing code enforcement programs
but also the potential success of rent withholding mechanisms.""3 If
the housing codes required the landlord to repair only that which was
reasonable, the likelihood of bargaining between the landlord and the
tenant would increase, and rent withholding could enhance the tenant's
bargaining position.149  This would be especially true if the landlord
lacked motivation to rehabilitate.150
The second area requiring reformation is the high level of property
taxes assessed in low income areas. The present level of taxation has
deterred code enforcement because money needed for rehabilitation has
to be paid to the city in taxes. 51 Presently, property taxes in low income
areas absorb twenty-five per cent of gross monthly rent in many low
income areas. 152 One reason for the high level of property taxes in low
income areas is that taxes are based on the value of the land rather than
a realistic assessment of its income potential. 53 Since the true value of
rental property depends upon its ability to earn income, the failure to
consider earning power results in over appraisal in low income areas. 54
In addition, the fear of having property reassessed after rehabilitation,
thus leading to higher taxes, has further deterred landlords from im-
proving their property.'55
Consequently, property taxes must be substantially reduced in low
income areas. The problem is that cities are already without adequate
sources of revenue.'5 6 Reducing city taxes might create further hard-
ship. On the other hand, such a reduction could prevent the loss of tax
revenue through abandonment; thus a partial balance might be at-
tained.'
57
148. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
149. See Moskovitz, The Model Landlord-Tenant Code-An Unacceptable Compro-
mise, 3 URBAN LAw. 597, 598 (1971).
150. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 217.
151. See notes 94-106 supra and accompanying text.
152. See note 100 supra.
153. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at xxi.
154. KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 104.
To remove this disincentive to good maintenance, tax assessors should look to the
earning ability of the property as reflected by annual gross rents in determining
the value of the property for tax purposes. . . . The level of rents which can be
charged for a unit often depend more on neighborhood characteristics than on the
condition of the property. Consequently, rehabilitation does not automatically
increase annual gross rents, and if it does not, it should not result in increased tax
assessments.
Id.
155. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13, at 211-12; see note 154 supra.
156. INNER-Crry HousiNG, supra note 96, at 118; SURvEY or ABANDONMENT, supra
note 1, at 48.
157. The survey conducted by the National Urban League indicated that Hoboken,
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The most substantial limitation on housing code enforcement is the
absence of an adequate financial package. The first element of this
financial package is the provision of capital necessary for rehabilita-
tion.158 The large amounts of money necessary for rehabilitation are
presently not available to the landlord of low income property from insti-
tutional lenders. 159 Instead, as noted previously, institutional lenders
are withdrawing from low income housing markets by refusing to refi-
nance loans. 160
Federal programs providing capital for rehabilitation do exist, but
these programs have been implemented almost exclusively in connection
with concentrated code enforcement activities within specific project
areas.1 1 One program, known as the 312 program," 2 seeks to provide
the necessary working capital either through new loans to cover the cost
of rehabilitation or through the refinancing of old mortgages to cover
both the old mortgage and rehabilitation. 63 These loans are particularly
beneficial because the annual interest rate is three percent. 6 4 A second
New York will not enforce housing codes if it means the loss of buildings from the
tax rolls. SURVEY OF ABANDONmENT, supra note 1, at 48. It is not contended that
the loss due to the reduction of property taxes will balance the loss averted by
controlling abandonment. It is contended that the offset could be significant.
158. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 110 supra.
160. Id.
161. Federally Assisted Cost Enforcement programs (FACE) provide grants to local
government to cover a proportion of the cost of housing code enforcement in a con-
centrated area under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (1970). Loans and grants are
available within those areas specified for concentrated code enforcement under au-
thority of 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1466 (1970) respectively.
Although these loans and grants can be made available in other areas, the conditions
for which this is possible are severely limited. 42 U.S.C. § 1452b(a)(1) (1970)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1466 (1970). Loans and grants under these programs are generally
available only in areas of concentrated code enforcement. ABANDONMENT AND RE-
HABrLrrATION, supra note 75, at 323.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (1970); see ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra
note 75, at 321.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(c)(4)(A) (1970). Unless the old mortgage is refinanced,
a rehabilitation loan would simply add to the existing expenditures for operating ex-
penses. With refinancing, the overall cost of the old mortgage and the rehabilitation
is lowered, making rehabilitation more feasible. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION,
supra note 75, at 323. Presently, only those landlords who meet certain income and
residence criteria can qualify for the refinancing provision. Id. One problem in
recasting mortgages is that they are greatly inflated when slum property is involved.
Unless the government adjusts these with an appropriate sale to assessment ratio, it
will be paying off these inflated mortgages. Id.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1452b(c)(3) (1970). The statute also specifies the maximum
term of the mortgage to be twenty years. 42 U.S.C. § 1452b(c) (2) (1970)..
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program presently available, known as the 115 Rehabilitation Grants,' 5
provides working capital by a direct grant to the property owner. This
program provides for grants of up to $3,500.'1" The 115 Rehabilita-
tion Grants are so severely limited both in the amount of aid available
and in the criteria used to determine recipients, that they can offer but
minimal assistance to the beleaguered landlord.
Present federal programs can be criticized on several grounds. First,
their scope is too confined. Code enforcement areas do not include all
areas in need of rehabilitation, particularly those areas just beginning the
process of deterioration. Immediate aid in these latter areas could avoid
the necessity of substantial rehabilitation. 6 7  The programs also rely on
FHA standards which are not only unrealistically high 6 s but which also
require costly certification of loans even for small projects.' 69 Presently,
rent withholding, like other forms of housing code enforcement, cannot
utilize federal financing of rehabilitation unless the property involved
is within a specific code enforcement area.170 The expansion of this type
of financing is critical to adequate housing code enforcement. As one
study of this problem indicated, the availability of low interest loans
greatly increases the number of structures for which rehabilitation is
feasible.'
71
While the availability of low interest loans to landlords increases the
number of buildings for which rehabilitation is possible, where deteriora-
tion is substantial, rent subsidies to low income tenants are essential.'
7 2
The availability of such subsidies is the second element required of any
financial package. Under present federal programs, tenant housing
subsidies are only available in the rental of newly constructed dwell-
ings and urban renewal, 73 but are not available to tenants of presently
existing substandard housing.' 7 4 Thus, low income tenants who pres-
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1466 (1970).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1466(c). Grants can be made under limited circumstances to a
family whose income exceeds $3,000. Id.
167. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 75, at 323. Sternlieb in his
study of Newark, New Jersey found that residents of federal project areas were un-
aware of the rehabilitation assistance available. TENEMENT LANDLORD, supra note 13,
at 186.
168. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILrrATION, supra note 75, at 322.
169. KAIsER REPORT, supra note 3, at 103.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1452b(a)(1) (1970).
171. CosTS AND OTHER EFFECTS ON OWNERS, supra note 108, pt. m, at 2.
172. KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 100; Grigsby, supra note 12, at 536; Housno
CODE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 80, at 36.
173. KAISER REPORT, supra note 3, at 100.
174. Id. In a sense the welfare system is at least in part a rent subsidy program.
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ently lack adequate financial resources with which to demand better
housing 75 are not eligible to receive subsidies with which to pay high-
er rent which in turn could provide landlords with the capital necessary
for rehabilitation.
The essential elements of the financing package for rehabilitation are
lacking. Working capital through loans is available only in limited areas,
while rent subsidies are not available at all. Housing code enforcement,
including rent withholding, "is simply not feasible without adequate
financing mechanisms." 176
CONCLUSION
As a legal response to a social problem, it is readily apparent that
rent withholding has failed miserably in low income areas. Rather than
supplying the low income tenant with a bargaining advantage useful
in obtaining adequate housing, it instead serves to his detriment, pre-
cipitating rent increases and frequently forcing abandonment. The
housing codes and rent withholding mechanisms have ignored the
fact that:
[U]ltimately the question gets back to one of economics. The gadgetry
will work if it pays the owner to repair. Normally, if it doesn't pay
the owner to repair and live up to code standards, the best remedial
devices in the world won't do the job. .... 177
David W. Tredway
The paradox of the welfare system is that, although it provides a subsidy to welfare
recipients, "it is the standard American welfare policy to pay clients an amount to keep
them just below the line considered by the same American public to constitute standard
housing." Housmi G CODE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 80, at 40 (emphasis added).
175. CAL. STUDIEs, supra note 126, ch. 'I, at 16.
176. ABANDONMENT AND REHABILTrrATioN, supra note 75, at 322.
177. Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN
LAw. 577, 591 (1971).
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